A Study on the Protection of Host States’ Interests under the Reform of ISDS Mechanism by 蓝维婕
学校编码：10384                                分类号      密级          
学号：13620141150222                                      UDC        
 
 
硕  士  学  位  论  文 
 
ISDS 机制改革下的东道国利益维护研究 
A Study on the Protection of Host States’ Interests under the 





专  业 名 称：国 际 法 学 
论文提交日期：2017年 3月 
论文答辩时间：2017年  月 
学位授予日期：2017年  月 
 
                               答辩委员会主席： 
评    阅    人： 
 



















另外，该学位论文为（                            ）课题（组）
的研究成果，获得（               ）课题（组）经费或实验室的

































（     ）1.经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，
于   年  月  日解密，解密后适用上述授权。 







                             声明人（签名）： 









































































Investor-State Dispute Settlement（ISDS) is the core of modern international 
investment system. Compared with the State-State dispute settlement mechanism, its 
main advantage is to provide opportunities and platform for investors to protect their 
own interests, giving investors the independence and autonomy. However, while ISDS 
is playing an increasingly important role in investment regime, some of its inherent 
problems are gradually emerging. 
Generally, ISDS are facing the problems as follows: the soaring numbers of 
dispute cases; the massive compensation; the transparency and impartiality of 
investment arbitration being questioned; unlimited interpretation power of the tribunal; 
the imperfect procedure of the appointment of arbitrators as well as the supervision 
mechanism; the lack of correction procedure and so on. In recent years, these 
problems have caused widespread international concerns and criticisms, one 
important reason of which is that these problems have caused bad effect to the host 
states especially the developing countries, calling for the reform of the ISDS 
mechanism. 
A lot of countries have responded to this by taking radical or gradual measures. 
They all further strengthen the states' power and tend to protect the host states' 
interests, in order to balance the imbalanced interests with foreign investors. 
Therefore, it is important to do more research on the issue of improving the ISDS 
mechanism, in order to protect the host states' interests and balance the interests of 
both parties. Thus, the questions such as "what are the problems and defects in the 
ISDS mechanism that may harm the interests of the host states" and "How should the 
international community and countries do to reform the ISDS mechanism for 
safeguarding the interests of the host states, especially the developing countries" are 
the key topics for this paper to discuss and solve. 
This paper consists of four chapters apart from the preface and the conclusion, 
talking about the issues as follows: the impact on the host states caused by ISDS 













order to protect the host states' interests; the potential reforming measures to protect 
the host states' interests; and since China has become the main capital exporting and 
importing country, what reforming measures could China take to protect our own 
interests. 
Finally, the conclusion states that the ISDS mechanism has caused many 
problems in its history, causing damages to the interests of the host states, and thus 
makes the improvement become the global consensus. The reforming measures could 
be taken from two aspects, one of which is to improve the mechanism of ISDS, taking 
the interests of the host states into this system; and the other is for host states to 
improve their own treaty provisions, both substantive and procedural ones. Besides, 
considering China has adopted a more relaxed attitude to ISDS nowadays, we should 
recognize the potential risks behind this, and take corresponding measures to improve 
the relevant provisions in order to avoid the potential disputes with foreign investors. 
More active participation in the formulation of new international investment rules is 
appreciated as well. 
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定 ISDS 条款的基础 IIA 的不同，ISDS 适用的仲裁规则也会有所不同。一般来说，
仲裁由独立于东道国司法机构的仲裁机构做出，主要是 ICSID，采用的仲裁规则
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仲裁， 这一机制的频繁适用使得投资仲裁案件数量激增。据 UNCTAD 统计数据
显示，截止 2017 年 2 月，已生效的双边投资条约总数已达 2329 个，② 其中绝大
多数都规定了争端解决条款。根据条约所提起的投资者与国家间的仲裁案件总数
已达 767 件，其中有 495 件提交到 ICSID。③ 而从 ICSID 建立伊始的 1966 年到
90 年代末的这一段时期内还只有 20 几个案件，但到 2004 年，案件数就达到了
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